Efficient capacity pricing of the internet services by Yoon, Chang-Ho et al.
Hitotsubashi University Repository
TitleEfficient capacity pricing of the internet services
Author(s) Yoon, Chang-Ho; Song, Young-Woong; Jun, Byoung Heon
Citation Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 46(2): 149-158
Issue Date 2005-12
Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version publisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10086/7655
RightEFFICIENT CAPACITY PRICING OF THE INTERNET SERVICES
C=6C<-HD YDDC













The paper examines the possibilities to improve e$ciency in Internet pricing by introduc-
ing pre-purchase contract. One can regard pre-purchase market as a device for providing
guaranteed services and as an alternative to smart market that can implement expected
capacity pricing in an e$cient manner. We ﬁnd that the pre-purchase market tends to
discriminate against the consumers who are less certain about their demands. We provide a
condition under which the discriminatory e#ect is overwhelmed by the market force, which
discourages the consumers with lower value by high premium. We also suggest a solution to
the discriminatory e#ect.
Keywords: Network congestion, Pre-purchase, Edge pricing, Smart market, Internet pricing
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I. Introduction
As the social demand for bandwidth ever increases over time, congestion in computer
networks seems inevitable. Despite extensive supply of network infrastructure and increasing
availability of bandwidth, entrepreneurial exploration of bandwidth-intensive applications and
services in content industries seems to put no upper bound on the use of bandwidth. Potential
scarcity of future bandwidth seems to have necessitated in-depth analysis of pricing policy in
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 46 (2005), pp.149-158.  Hitotsubashi Universitymodern computer networks and reconsideration of the ﬂat rate pricing under over-
provisioning policy (McKnight and Boroumand, 2000). Various concepts of e$ciency that
incorporate not only economic e$ciency but architectural network e$ciency and administra-
tive costs have been examined.
The ﬁrst monumental market mechanism to resolve network congestion was introduced
by MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995) who then theoretically applied incentive-compatible
Vickrey auction to determine priorities among the packets of data that are waiting at each
node of their path toward ﬁnal destination. Although the smart market mechanism is ex post
economically e$cient, feasibility of implementation has become more important concern to
many researchers. In addition to administrative costs of implementing a numerous number of
bidding mechanisms at each node of long and complicated conﬁguration of networks that are
connected by routers, there would be the costs of calculating the utility loss of delay that are
caused by retransmission of packets of losing bidders, which would normally be prohibitive.
The problems related to valuation of sequences of packets reveal another aspect of technical
di$culties associated with implementation of smart market mechanism (see for example,
Cre ´ mer and Hariton, 1999 in this direction).
Doubts about feasibility of smart market mechanism and inaccessibility of marginal
congestion costs lead to reshaping the research agenda toward technically more tractable
mechanism that however retains some elements of usage sensitivity and localized pricing policy
(see for example, Shenker, Clark, Estrin and Herzog, 1996, and Clark, 1997). The so called
edge pricing and expected capacity pricing are both implemented locally at the access point or
the edge of the ISP’s network where the user’s packets enter. Once the source and the ﬁnal
destination are known, the entire computation of charges is performed at the access point, and
is based on the expected capacity requirement and expected congestion costs along the
expected path of packets between the source and destination. It performs like time-of-day
telephone pricing that depends only on expectations about the current congestion costs, and is
not sensitive to instantaneous tra$c condition. The shift of emphasis from the per-packet
charge to the user cost of purchasing the required capacity for transmission of their informa-
tion rekindle interests in the ﬂat rate pricing since it is essentially deﬁned as a peak rate and can
be modiﬁed in a ﬂexible manner whenever a user needs more than the capacity that was
previously purchased. It may in fact take various forms of mixtures of capacity-based prices
and usage-based prices. The ﬂat rate pricing system o#ers a starting point to develop higher
quality of service in general.
Although this possibility was already examined in the edge pricing literature, the e$ciency
comparison of various modes of capacity pricing was not on the urgent research agenda.
Especially the theoretical possibility of enhancing e$ciency by introducing a contract to
pre-purchase expected required capacity was not noticed in the literature. The new pricing
policy may incorporate intertemporal variation of expected capacity pricing that reﬂects users’
valuation more accurately in pricing of network capacity. Under the ﬂat rate system, users
have equal chance to get allocated the scarce capacity independently of their willingness to
pay. Under pre-purchase contract only those who are willing to pay high price get the greater
chance to use the capacity when congestion occurs. This treatment opens the possibility of
increasing allocative e$ciency.
However, pre-purchase system is not always more e$cient than the ﬂat rate system when
there is no appropriate mechanism to distinguish those frequent users who have nearly
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December +/*constant demand across various states of natures from non-frequent users whose demand
ﬂuctuates across various states of nature. It may be the case that non-frequent users might
have valuable messages to send but the utility value of messages for them may fall short of the
equilibrium premium price. In fact the network operator would sell the greater amount of
capacity than is actually used in the market clearing state knowing that only the portion of the
contracted capacity for non-frequent users will actually be used. The downward pressure in the
pre-purchase contract price induces frequent users to contract more of the capacity for their
use while the resulting e#ective capacity price that the non-frequent user pays in equilibrium
turns out to be much greater than the price that the network provider receives at the market
equilibrium.
The e$ciency gain from the use of pre-purchase contract requires the additional assump-
tion that expected capacity cost of non-frequent users must be less than the average surplus
value of frequent users. If this assumption is not satisﬁed, it is always possible for some of
non-frequent users to form coalition and share the capacity by distributing the cost among
themselves. It is certainly socially more e$cient to allocate the capacity to them than to
frequent users who send messages only of low value. One way to discriminate them is to give
refund to those whose usage time is low. This requires monitoring of usage and technically
more demanding. If however it is possible to monitor each consumer’s usage, it is always
possible to make an equilibrium with pre-purchase contract ex ante e$cient.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate e$ciency of capacity pricing. Starting from the
ﬂat rate system, the paper presents a theoretical model to examine the possibility of improving
e$ciency with minimal additional technical requirements. The paper does not focus on how to
calculate expected capacity and congestion costs that are associated with the entire transmis-
sion path. Neither the paper deals with formation of users’ expectations on the extent of
congestion. Rather it addresses the question regarding the e$cient use of existing scarce
capacity among users who have di#ering valuation of transmission of information through
Internet. The paper begins with a basic model of congestion and e$ciency analysis of the ﬂat
rate system and pre-purchase contract. Comparison with other market mechanism to resolve
congestion is presented. The concluding comments on technical consideration that are
necessary to implement pre-purchase contract brieﬂy follows, and related research agenda on
quality of service provision will be brieﬂy discussed.
II. Model
We begin with a basic model where the expected capacity required between the source and
the ﬁnal destination is already decided and normalized to be one unit, therefore consider a very
simple network where just one representative operator (ISP) provides Internet access service.
We assume that tra$c generated from the source will be assumed to be delivered to the ﬁnal
destination via the single node. In this sense network congestion can be deﬁned to be a state
where the capability of the node (capacity) doesn’t meet incoming tra$c’s demand any more.
Internet service user may have two-dimensional requirement for Internet services. One
dimension is for ‘Quality of Service’ requirement and the other is for ‘Quantity of Service’
requirement. Though there are seemingly di#erences between two kinds of QoS requirements,
they are intrinsically the same in that the further we go up in either scale, the more capacity
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conditional on the same Quality of Service requirement and bandwidth-based capacity given
the same quantity requirement. From now on we assume that the two-dimensional requirement
can be integrated, so that consumers’ requirements (demand) and ISP’s constrained capacity
(supply) is denoted by a certain unit (e.g. bpsnumber of packets or length of period).
There are two states of nature, s1 and s2, state si occurring with probability mi, and two
types of consumers. Those with certain demand (type c) will have demands in both states with
probability 1, and those with uncertain demands (type u) will have demands with probability
q1 in state s1 and with probability q2 (q1) in state s2. For simplicity we assume that each
consumer demands only one unit,
1 and that there are a continuum of consumers, measure a
of type c and measure b of type u. Without loss of generality we normalize b to 1. The value
that consumers derive from consumption of internet service (normalized by a deﬁned unit) is
assumed to be distributed on the interval [v v, v v] with distribution functions F for type c and G
for type u. The value v is assumed to be known to every consumer in advance, although its
realization is uncertain for type u consumers. The type and value of consumers are assumed to
be private information, although the distribution functions F and G are common knowledge.
Under these assumptions market demand will be aq1 in state s1 and aq2 in s2.
Although individual type u consumers have uncertain demands, there is no aggregate uncer-
tainty in the market demand due to the assumption of “large number” (continuum) of
consumers. We denote the total capacity (during a certain period) by k and assume that a
q1kaq2. Hence not all demands are satisﬁed in state s2. When there is no mechanism to
curtail the demand in state s2, rationing should take place. This is what happens under the ﬂat
rate system. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that consumers and suppliers are
risk neutral.
III. Flat Rate System vs. Pre-purchase Market
1. Flat Rate System
Under the ﬂat rate system everyone is treated equally. When congestion occurs the ﬁrst
comer gets served ﬁrst. Since each consumer has equal chance to be a ﬁrst comer, each
consumer gets served with probability k/(aq2)i ns 2, the congestion state. In order to
illustrate what happens we consider an example in which a1, q10.2, q20.8, k1.5, m1
m21/2, and the value of both types are uniformly distributed on [1, 2]. In s1, the non-
congestion state, market demand is less than the capacity and everyone who happens to have
demand gets the service. On the other hand, in s2, the congestion state, the consumers who
have demand get served with probability 5/6.
2 The ex ante total surplus is
1 Therefore, consumers in our model are homogeneous in Quality and Quantity of Service requirements. If one
wants to include heterogeneous consumer (in terms of Quality of Service requirement) into the model, he or she
can do so by introducing more general demand function.
2 We assume that the (ﬁxed) price is so low that everyone is subscribed. Alternatively, we focus on the
consumers who are subscribed under the current price.































We consider the performance of a pre-purchase market under the same environment
considered in the previous example. In the pre-purchase market consumers purchase the right
to use the service in congestion state for a premium. In e#ect they buy a kind of contingent
contract that will insure consumption in congestion state. If congestion occurs, the suppliers
allocate the capacity ﬁrst to the consumers who paid the premium, and then to those who did
not if there is any remaining capacity. Hence, in order for the pre-purchase market to function
properly we need to have a device in the network that will distinguish the consumers who paid
the premium from those who did not.
3 To have such a device could be costly, but certainly less
costly than the device required for the smart market.
We assume that the suppliers set the premium in such a way that all the capacity is sold
in the pre-purchase market. This would be the case if the pre-purchase market were competi-
tive. It also looks plausible to allocate scarce resources to those who are willing to pay the
most. Hence the government may want to enforce such an outcome when the suppliers are
regulated. As in the previous subsection we maintain the assumption that a1, q10.2, q2
0.8, k1.5, m1m21/2, and that the value of both types are uniformly distributed on [1, 2].
First, we calculate the level of the premium for the pre-purchase contract. That is, we will
ﬁnd out the price which will equate the demand and the given supply. The ex ante value of the
contract to a type c consumer is v. Since there is congestion with probability 1/2, and since v/
2 is uniformly distributed on [1/2, 1] with density 2, the demand of type c consumers is







where F*is the distribution function of v/2 of type c consumers. Similarly, the demand of type
u consumers is







where G*is the distribution function of 0.4v of type u consumers. The price is determined at
the level where demand equals supply. Since only 80% of type u consumers will actually need
the service, the equilibrium requires
Dc(p)0.8Du(p)1.5 (4)
From (2), (3), and (4), we get p0.525. Hence, 0.95 of type c consumers and 0.6875 of type
3 One such device is a dedicated line.
4 Dc(p)1, for p1/2.
5 Du(p)1, for p0.4.





























Comparing (1) with (5), one can see that the pre-purchase contract yields higher total surplus.
Under the ﬁxed rate system everyone gets equal chance to be served, whether he/she values the
service high or low. Under the pre-purchase contract, on the other hand, only those who value
the service high are served. Then, is it the case that the pre-purchase system always yields
better outcome than the ﬂat rate system? The answer is no as the following example shows.
3. An Example
Suppose that m10 (only congestion state occurs), ab1, q10, q21/2, k1e,
where e
0. Suppose further that all type c consumers have the same value, v1, and that all
type u consumers have the same value, v1.8. Under the ﬂat rate system everyone has the




Under the pre-purchase system type c consumers would pay up to 1, whereas type u consumers
would pay up to 0.9. Premium will be 0.9, and all of type c consumers as well as 2e of type u




Clearly the ﬂat rate system performs better. The reason is that the pre-purchase system in the
current form favors the consumers who are willing to pay more, regardless of the capacity they
require. In this example, the suppliers need 1 unit of capacity to serve one type c consumer,
while they need only 1/2 unit of capacity to serve one type u consumer. Since the suppliers
cannot distinguish type u consumers from type c consumers, the pricing of pre-purchase
market works against type u consumers who is actually less likely to claim the service, hence
requires less capacity. This example gives us an idea about how to improve on the pre-purchase
system, which we will consider in section IV.
4. General Comparison of the Two Systems
We can now compare the total surpluses obtained under the two systems. The total



























where rk/(aq2) is the probability that each consumer gets the service. The total surplus



























where vc(vu) is the value of the type c (type u) consumer just willing to pay the premium p. vc




















which is the same as the second term of TS
p in (5’). Using the inverse functions we can also
rewrite the second term of TS
















We can now provide a su$cient condition for the pre-purchase system to perform better
than the ﬂat rate system. Denote the equilibrium price in the pre-purchase market by p*.p *is
deﬁned by
Dc(p*)q2Du(p*)k. (4’)







p*/q2, then the pre-purchase system yields higher total surplus
than the ﬂat rate system.
Before we present the proof, let us examine the meaning of the theorem. The LHS of the
inequality is the average value assigned to the premium service by the type c consumers who
actually purchase the service. The RHS is the e#ective price of the premium service faced by
type u consumers. Since type u consumers has to pay p*for the service which they will use only
with probability q2, the e#ective price of the service is p*/q2 for them. This is the reason why
the pre-purchase system may yield poor performance as illustrated in the example of the
previous subsection. One can improve upon the pre-purchase system by choosing one type u
consumer who was eliminated in the pre-purchase market and let him/her get the service
instead of one type c consumer. If we use the ﬂat rate system, this can be done but only
through random selection. The theorem says that even if we choose the best of type u
consumer who was eliminated in the pre-purchase market (whose value of the service cannot
exceed p*/q2), the e$ciency cannot be enhanced if the type c consumers who are in the market
value the service more than p*/q2 on average.
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pTS














































































































p*dqu(aq* c )p*q2(1q* u )p*/q2











Pc(q)dq/q* c p*/q2, then we have
A*[(aq* c )q2(1q* u )] p*/q2. (14)
From (13) and (14), we get the desired inequality. (Q.E.D.)
IV. Smart Market vs. the Pre-purchase Market
Basically, the model considered in this paper is about capacity-based pricing while smart
market is about packet-based pricing, so that there seems to be no general way to compare the
two pricing systems. But so far as the quantity of demand and supply are normalized and
consumers have homogeneous requirements for Quality of Service as we assumed before,
6 the
two pricing systems can be compared with each other.
The two markets allocate the capacity in the same way when there is no congestion (state
s1). They allocate the capacity di#erently when there is congestion (state s2). The di#erence is
shown in Figure 1. In the smart market the capacity is allocated to the consumers who are
willing to pay the market clearing price p2.k c of type c consumers and kukkc of type u
consumers get to use the capacity. Smart market is ex post e$cient, and hence is ex ante
e$cient in a risk-neutral environment.
On the other hand, the capacity is allocated to the consumers who are willing to pay the
premium p* ex ante. k* c of type c consumers and k* u (kk* c )/q2 of type u consumers are
willing to pay p*ex ante. Type u consumers, however, get the chance to consume (one unit of
the capacity) only with probability q2. Hence, they are e#ectively paying p*/q2 as the premium
6 This implies that the quantity of demand in our model is a linear function of the number of packets that are
the quantity of demand in smart market.
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there is price discrimination as a result, the allocation is not e$cient in the pre-purchase
market. Is it possible to improve the pre-purchase market? One simple way is to give refunds
to those who did not use the service. Then type u consumers get refunds with probability 1
q2,e #ectively paying p*.
7 Since everyone pays the same price, the capacity allocation will be
the same as in the smart market.
Introduction of refund requires additional technology. The supplier now needs to trace
the usage of the consumers who paid the premium. However, this technology would be less
demanding than that required for the smart market. It is not hard to construct examples in
which the pre-purchase market is ex ante more e$cient than the smart market when the
consumers are risk averse.
V. Conclusion
Since the smart market was proposed as a solution to the problem of congestion in the
Internet, not much research has been conducted on the Internet pricing. It is partly because
smart market provides the ultimate answer one can expect at least in risk neutral environment,
and partly because Internet congestion is less severe due to technological improvement in data
transfer. However, the technological burden that the smart market imposes is not trivial, and
it seems natural to ask what alternatives we have to avoid unwanted interruption of data
transfer. This becomes more and more important as people want to transfer larger and larger
data containing voices and images. New demands are created as people think of new data that
they want to transfer. One never knows when the demands catch up the speed of network
expansion.
In this paper we investigated the pre-purchase market as an alternative to the smart
market and as a device for providing guaranteed services in ex ante perspective. One merit of
7 In this case p*will be the same as m2p2.
F><.1 .
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and structural issues. We found that the pre-purchase market tends to discriminate against the
consumers who are less certain about their demands. We provided a condition under which the
discriminatory e#ect is overwhelmed by the market force, which discourages the consumers
with lower value by high premium. If we regard a local network operator (ISP) as a ﬁnal user
of upstream network, the analysis to more complicated networks can easily be extended.
There are several protocols that meet various kinds of consumer needs for QoS techni-
cally, such as RSVP or ST-II protocol. As the speciﬁcations of these protocols have not yet
been fully developed to implement complicated networks, our framework for guaranteed
service may require some more time to be globally implemented. However, conﬁning our focus
to local network, we can consider pre-purchase market as an e$cient solution to network
congestion with least technical di$culties.
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